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In this article, dynamic interactions among stock return, Research and Development (R&D) investment, patent applications and patent propensity 
of firms are studied. Patent innovation leader and follower firms are identified with respect to their quality-adjusted knowledge stock. Significant 
and positive dynamic spillover effects are obtained in a panel vector autoregressive model. We find positive dynamic spillover effects from patent 
innovation leader to followers. We show that an increasing degree of competition enhances innovation and patent applications, which helps 
firms appropriating part of the benefits of their R&D investments.1. Introduction
The objective of thiswork is to learn about dynamic interactions
(spillovers) between patent innovation leaders and followers,
allowing for different degrees of propensity to patent for different
firms. We use patent and firm-specific panel data of 4476 firms
for all manufacturing and service industries of the United States
(US) for period 1979–2000. Firms are classified into technological
groups with respect to technological proximity. We focus on a
specific technological cluster of 111 firms, which are mainly from
the drugs market sector. We identify patent innovation leaders
and followers of the cluster with respect to their quality-adjusted
knowledge stock.
We consider different dynamic measures of innovation activity
that may capture patented Research and Development (R&D)
activity (i.e., publicly disclosed innovations) and non-patented
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(A. Escribano).R&Dactivity (i.e., non-appropriated R&Dor trade secrets). Patented
and non-patented R&D activities are estimated by using a latent
variable patent count panel data model. In this model, patent
propensity is driven by a common latent factor, which represents
unobservable common effects of the technological cluster. These
common effects are, for example, degree of market competition,
degree of deregulation, degree of enforcement of intellectual
property rights and degree of information that is common
knowledge. We study dynamic R&D spillovers among patent
innovation leaders and followers by Panel Vector Autoregressive
(PVAR) models. The econometric models applied involve variables
that are observed by those firm managers who choose what
proportion of firm R&D output to patent or keep secret, but the
same variables are not included in the dataset available to the
econometrician.
As noted by Boldrin and Levine (2008, p. 8): ‘‘we should protect
not only the property rights of innovators but also the rights of
those who have legitimately obtained a copy of the idea, directly
or indirectly, from the original innovator. The former encourages
innovation; the latter encourages the diffusion, adoption and
improvement of innovations’’. In this work, we show that more
competition increases patent propensity and R&D investment in1
order to enhance the absorptive capacity of firms (Escribano et al.,
2009) thus more innovation and more patents are produced.
This transmission mechanism has an extra dynamic multiplier
effect through the spillovers between innovation leaders and
followers. We find positive dynamic spillover effects from patent
innovation leader to followers, but not the other way around.
We also find support for the inverted-U relationship between
market competition and innovation (Aghion et al., 2005). Increase
in market competition conditions within the technological cluster
are related to rise in patent propensity, and vice versa (feedback).
This suggests that pharmaceutical firms reacted to the increasing
level of market competition by patenting a significantly higher
proportion of their innovation output after 1990,which at the same
time expanded the diffusion of knowledge among competitors,
enhancing innovation.
The remainder of this work is organized as follows. Section 2
reviews the literature. Section 3 presents the dataset, technological
clustering of firms, and definitions of patent innovation leaders
and followers. Section 4 describes the econometric models and
presents empirical findings. Section 5 discusses our results about
competition and patent propensity. Section 6 summarizes and
concludes.
2. Literature review
2.1. Firm value and innovation activity
During recent decades, innovations protected by patents have
played a key role in business strategies. This fact motivated a
number of studies about the determinants of patents and impact
of patents on innovation, firm value and competitive advantage.
Griliches (1981) constructs knowledge-based variables from
lagged R&D expenses and number of patents. He finds significant
positive association among market value, R&D expenditure and
number of patents for a panel of large US firms. Lev and Sougiannis
(1996) estimate the inter-temporal relation between R&D capital
and stock return of US firms, and they show that R&D capital is
associatedwith subsequent stock returns (see also Lev et al., 2005).
Blundell et al. (1999) examine the relationship between surprise
innovations and firm performance by using a dynamic count panel
data model, and find a positive impact of innovation on market
value of US firms. Chan et al. (2001) show a positive relationship
between R&D capital to market value and abnormal future stock
returns. They also find evidence of a delayed association of R&D
activity and future excess stock returns, which could be due to
a delayed reaction of the stock market or inadequate adjustment
for risk (Chambers et al., 2002). Hall et al. (2005) investigate the
association between knowledge stock and market value in the US
for period 1963–1995. Their results show that, in addition to patent
counts, patent citations also contain important information about
stock market value.
2.2. Innovation leaders and followers
Technological improvement gives competitive advantage to in-
novator companies. Nevertheless, the non-rival nature of knowl-
edge may create a business-stealing effect among competitors, as
innovator’s efforts may decrease the cost of competitor firms’ sub-
sequent innovations. Firms strategically decide to be R&D leaders
or followers. Companies that introduce innovative products are
R&D leaders, while other firms, who mimic products of innova-
tion leaders, are followers. There is a large body of literature in
economics and strategicmanagement,which differentiates amongfirms with respect to their R&D and patenting activity, in order to
study the implications of the research intensity of firms on com-
petitors’market value and innovations. Results in this body of liter-
ature suggest that R&D leaders have sustained future profitability.
Jaffe (1986) finds evidence of knowledge spillovers by using
various indicators of R&D activity. He evidences that firms that
invest in research in a sector where there is high R&D intensity,
obtain more patents per dollar of R&D, higher accounting profit
to R&D and higher market value to R&D, than firms in a sector
with low R&D intensity. Nabseth and Ray (1974), Mansfield et al.
(1981), Rogers (1983) and Pakes and Schankerman (1984) report
that knowledge spills over gradually in a dynamic manner to other
firms. Aghion et al. (2005) develop a model where competition
discourages laggard firms, but encourages neck-and-neck firms to
innovate. Due to the effect of competition on equilibrium industry
structure, theirmodel generates an invertedU-shaped relationship
between innovation and competition. They also show that average
technological distance between innovation leaders and followers
increases with competition and the inverted-U is steeper when
industries are more neck-and-neck. Lev et al. (2006) differentiate
between R&D leaders and followers and compare stock market
valuation of leaders and followers. They show that R&D leaders
earn significant future excess returns, while R&D followers only
earn average returns. Ciftci et al. (2011) find that R&D leaders
obtain substantial risk-adjusted returns during the first four to five
future years, following a new innovation. However, these excess
returns converge to those of R&D followers, afterwards.
3. Data
The dataset includes N = 4476 firms from all manufacturing
and service industries of the US economy for period 1979–2000
(T = 22 years). These firms published more than 500,000 patents
during the sample period. We created the dataset based on the
recommendations of Hall et al. (2001).
Data used in this work are from several sources. Patent data
are from two sources: (a) National Bureau of Economic Research
(NBER) US Patent Citations Data File and (b) MicroPatent LLC.
The patent database includes the US Patent and Trademark Office
(USPTO) patent number, application date, publication date, patent
number of cited patents, three-digit US technological class and
assignee name (company name, if the patent was assigned to
a firm). Furthermore, annual stock return data were obtained
from the Center for Research on Stock Prices (CRSP). Additional
company-specific data have been obtained from Standard & Poor’s
Compustat data files. The firm-level dataset includes book value of
equity, stock market value, Standard Industry Classification (SIC)
code and R&D expenditure. Firm-specific accounting data were
corrected for inflation by using the US Consumer Price Index (CPI)
(source: US Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics).
In the remaining part of this section, we describe the
technological clustering procedure as applied to US firms. Then,we
present the definitions of patent innovation leaders and followers.
3.1. Technological proximity
We use a patent-based technological proximity measure
in order to classify firms into technologically-similar groups.
Technological clusters are formed as follows. For each firm, we
assign technological categories based on their patent applications,
with respect to the technological classification of Hall et al.
(2001). These authors created 36 technological sub-categories2
Table 1
Product-market-based industry classification in the technological cluster.
SIC industry name SIC code K HV industry name K
Pharmaceutical preparations 2834 47 Pharmaceuticals 92
Biological products (no-diagnostic substances) 2836 31 Non-manufacturing 10
In vitro and in vivo diagnostic substances 2835 7 Computers 4
Perfumes, cosmetics and other toiletry preparations 2844 3 Chemical products 2
Surgical and medical instruments, and apparatus 3841 3 Food and tobacco 2
Medicinal chemicals and botanical products 2833 2 Plastics and rubber products 1
Wholesale-drugs, proprietaries and druggists’ sundries 5122 2
Services-medical laboratories 8071 2
Grain mill products 2040 1
Beverages 2080 1
Chemicals and allied products 2800 1
Soap, detergents, perfumes and cosmetics 2840 1
Paints, varnishes, lacquers, enamels and allied products 2851 1
Agricultural chemicals 2870 1
Plastics products 3089 1
Electro-medical and electro-therapeutic apparatus 3845 1
Wholesale-medical, dental and hospital equipment 5047 1
Fire, marine and casualty insurance 6331 1
Services-hospitals 8060 1
Services-engineering, accounting, research and management 8700 1
Services-commercial physical and biological research 8731 1
Non-operating establishments 9995 1
Total number of firms in the technological cluster 111 111
Notes: Standard Industry Classification (SIC). Number of firms (K ). Hall and Vopel (HV, 1997) classification.from the patent technological classification of USPTO that contains
about 400 technological classes. We apply Ward’s (1963) linkage
clustering to perform technological clustering; motivated by
Kuiper and Fisher (1975) and Jain et al. (1986). We use the angle
distance measure to form technological clusters of firms which
is purely directional therefore it is not affected by the degree of
concentration of the research interests of firms (Jaffe, 1986). The
technological clustering procedure creates a technology-related
grouping of 16 clusters for the 4476 US companies.
We focus on a specific cluster of N = 111 companies. Table 1
shows the product-market industries of firms in the technological
cluster, with respect to two classifications. First, according to
SIC, the technological cluster includes 87 firms from the SIC283
drugs sector. Second, with respect to the modified SIC of Hall and
Vopel (1997), 92 companies of the technological cluster are in the
pharmaceutical sector. Table 1 also presents that the technological
cluster includes companies fromother product-market sectors. For
example, it includes firms from the grain mill products (SIC2040),
beverages (SIC2080), paints (SIC2851), plastics products (SIC3089)
and electro-medical and electro-therapeutic apparatus (SIC3845)
industries. Fig. 1(a) shows the evolution of total patent application
count of firms in the technological cluster for period 1979–2000.
The figure shows a significant growth of patent application counts
for the sample period. The level of patent applications per year was
about 600 patents in 1979, which grew to about 1300 patents per
year in 2000.
3.2. Patent innovation leaders and followers
We define the permanent Innovation Leader (IL) firm, with
respect to the absolute temporal dominance observed in the
evolution of quality-adjusted knowledge stock, built up from
the citations weighted annual patent counts. The evolution of
knowledge stock of firm i is computed by
t
s=1 FCisPis(1 − δ)t−s
for t = 1, . . . , T , where Pis denotes the number of successful
patent applications for firm i and in period s (i.e., patent application
count); FCis is the number of citations received from subsequent
patents (i.e., forward citations), corrected for sample truncationbias, for firm i and in period s. We use FCis to weight patent counts
as Lanjouw and Schankerman (1999) and Hall et al. (2001) report
that the number of forward patent citations is an appropriate
measure of patent quality. More recent patents in the end of the
sample have less chance to receive citations from later patents
than earlier patents. This creates a sample truncation bias for the
forward citations count.We correct for this biaswith respect to the
fixed effects approach suggested by Hall et al. (2001). Motivated by
Hall (1993) and Hall et al. (2005), we use the annual depreciation
rate δ = 15% to account for decreasing value of past knowledge.
The firm with the highest quality-adjusted knowledge stock in
every year of the observation period is the permanent patent IL of
the technological cluster. We define the dummy variable Dit(i =
IL) that takes the value one in period t if firm i is the permanent
IL, and zero otherwise. Other firms in the technological cluster are
in the permanent patent Innovation Follower (IF) group.We define
the dummy variable Dit(i ∈ IF) that takes the value one in period t
if firm i is in the permanent IF group, and zero otherwise.
Table 2 shows 20 firms out of the 111 of the technological
cluster for period 1979–2000. The table shows the average of each
of the following variables computed over the sample period: (V1)
patent application count Pit ; (V2) forward citations received count
F˜Cit ; (V3) forward citations received count corrected for sample
truncation bias FCit ; (V4) knowledge stock
t
s=1 FCisPis(1− δ)t−s;
(V5) log of R&D expenses rit ; (V6) log of book value of equity BVit ;
(V7) log of market value of equity MVit ; (V8) log R&D expenses to
log sales rit/sit ; (V9) log R&D expenses to logmarket value rit/MVit .
In the technological cluster, firms are ranked according to mean
(V4). Table 2 presents the first 20 firmswith respect to this ranking.
The table shows that for seven out of the nine variables, Merck &
Co., Inc. (Merck) is the leader.
Table 3 presents the evolution of knowledge stock for eight
firms with the highest mean (V4) for period 1979–2000. The table
shows that the quality-adjusted knowledge stock of Merck was
permanently higher than that of other firms in every year. This
result also supports our conclusion that Merck is the permanent
patent IL of the technological cluster. In addition, Fig. 1(e) shows
the evolution of log of number of patent applications and log
of knowledge stock of IL, and cross-sectional mean of log of3
(a) Latent-factor intensity estimates. (b) Competition-factor intensity estimates.
(c) Latent common factor. (d) Observable competition factor.
(e) Patent applications and knowledge stock per firm. (f) Mean patent propensity.
Fig. 1. Patent applications, patent intensity and patent propensity. Notes: (a) Evolution of total patent count
N
i=1 Pit and total patent intensity
N
i=1 λit for the patent count
data model with latent common factor for t = 1, . . . , T ; (b) evolution of total patent countNi=1 Pit and total patent intensityNi=1 λit for the patent count data model with
observable competition factor for t = 1, . . . , T ; (c) estimates of E[l∗t | F ot ] for t = 1, . . . , T ; (d) evolution of market competition COt for t = 1, . . . , T ; (e) patent application
count and knowledge stock per firm for IL and IF for t = 1, . . . , T ; (f) evolution of mean patent propensity (1/N)Ni=1 P∗t in percentage, for t = 1, . . . , T .
patent applications and log of knowledge stock of IFs for period
1979–2000. This figure also suggests the selection of Merck for
permanent IL, since both variables of Merck are higher than
the corresponding variables of IFs for every year for period
1979–2000.1
1 We also classify firmswith respect to their knowledge stock to Group of Leaders
(GL) and Group of Followers (GF). We form these groups based on the mean (V4)
knowledge stock variable by using Ward’s (1963) clustering method. GL includes
Merck; Eli Lilly; Abbott Laboratories; Warner–Lambert; Pfizer; Bristol–Myers
Squibb; American Home Products; Alza. Tables 2 and 3 present mean (V1) to (V9)
and evolution of knowledge stock, respectively, for these firms. We estimate the
model presented in Section 4.4 for both IL–IF and GL–GF clusters. We find similar
results for both clustering thus in this workwe only report the IL–IF results. Blazsek
and Escribano (2014) present the GL–GF results.4. Econometric models and empirical results
4.1. Benchmark innovation and market value model
Innovation activity has a positive impact on future cash flow
and current value of firms, which motivates owners to promote
R&D. As profits on innovative activity are realized during several
years in the future, current accounting-based net profit is a rather
noisy measure of R&D benefits. Pakes (1985) focuses on dynamic
relationships among a number of successful patent applications,
R&Dexpenditures and stockmarket value of firms. Pakes concludes
that events that lead themarket to revalue the firmare significantly
correlated with unpredictable changes in both R&D and patent
applications. Pakes’ work avoids the problem of timing differential4
Table 2
Patent innovations leadership classification of firms.
Firm name (SIC) Cluster (V1) (V2) (V3) (V4) (V5) (V6) (V7) (V8) (V9)
1. Merck (2834) IL GL 217.6 1367.5 136.7 147232.4 12.39 8.47 13.20 0.82 1.16
2. Eli Lilly (2834) IF GL 116.0 613.6 58.6 43645.5 12.21 8.15 12.69 0.83 1.17
3. Abbott Lab. (2834) IF GL 97.5 720.8 73.9 40954.3 11.89 7.91 12.67 0.80 1.13
4. Warner–Lambert (2834) IF GL 81.7 656.2 61.3 31542.0 10.64 7.23 10.55 0.75 1.29
5. Pfizer (2834) IF GL 103.0 553.2 49.1 23373.0 12.21 8.32 12.79 0.81 1.16
6. Bristol–Myers (2834) IF GL 69.7 307.4 34.2 11509.1 12.11 8.27 12.95 0.80 1.14
7. Am. Home Prod. (2834) IF GL 52.8 330.7 30.7 8396.9 10.82 8.05 11.38 0.72 1.25
8. Alza (2834) IF GL 35.5 547.6 40.9 7683.0 8.24 5.28 9.92 0.78 1.01
9. Mallinckrodt (2835) IF GF 23.5 181.9 16.9 2007.8 9.25 6.92 9.82 0.68 1.11
10. Pharmacia & U. (2834) IF GF 21.4 45.9 8.5 1922.6 10.96 7.45 10.34 0.79 1.34
11. Church & Dwight (2840) IF GF 12.3 83.4 9.9 1537.8 7.96 5.10 9.74 0.66 0.89
12. NeoRx (2835) IF GF 6.5 68.4 7.8 500.5 7.25 4.12 7.92 1.07 0.96
13. Alliance Pharma. (2834) IF GF 4.2 69.9 6.9 369.8 7.42 4.33 8.83 1.06 0.87
14. Xoma (2836) IF GF 6.9 48.7 5.0 329.6 8.11 4.21 8.84 1.15 0.96
15. Enzon (2836) IF GF 4.2 47.1 6.0 235.9 6.95 4.13 8.79 1.08 0.83
16. Guilford Pharma. (2834) IF GF 3.5 23.0 4.9 216.5 6.75 4.20 6.98 0.98 1.01
17. Sugen (2836) IF GF 4.4 23.8 4.0 216.2 6.50 4.02 6.42 0.95 1.05
18. Inhale Therap. (2834) IF GF 2.5 31.3 7.0 169.3 6.33 4.17 7.15 0.92 0.97
19. Corvas (2836) IF GF 3.5 16.3 2.1 122.5 6.58 4.07 7.00 1.00 1.00
20. Molecular Bios. (2835) IF GF 2.0 57.5 4.8 90.5 6.97 4.23 7.97 1.02 0.93
Notes: Standard Industry Classification (SIC); Innovation Leader (IL); Innovation Follower (IF); Group of Leaders (GL); Group of Followers (GF). The table presents nine
variables for 20 out of the 111 firms of the technological cluster. Average values for period 1979–2000 of the following variables are presented: (V1) patent application
count; (V2) forward citations received count; (V3) forward citations received count corrected for sample truncation bias; (V4) knowledge stock; (V5) log R&D expenses; (V6)
log book value of equity; (V7) log market value of equity; (V8) log R&D expenses to log sales; (V9) log R&D expenses to log stock market value.Table 3
Knowledge stock of some firms from the technological cluster.
Year Merck Eli Lilly Abbott Lab. Warner–Lambert Pfizer Bristol–Myers American Home P. Alza
1979 31,215 4,269 4,467 571 4,804 778 1,087 1,049
1980 51,807 13,245 6,246 1,411 6,131 1,237 2,269 2,805
1981 65,132 21,253 6,629 3,498 7,800 1,679 3,108 3,014
1982 73,959 21,034 7,164 4,159 8,658 1,739 3,135 3,681
1983 79,546 22,916 7,026 8,318 9,752 2,061 3,422 3,815
1984 83,616 25,138 6,928 16,406 11,298 2,521 3,433 4,806
1985 89,006 25,415 6,517 30,040 16,978 3,292 3,961 5,523
1986 97,238 23,248 7,754 43,104 18,579 3,694 5,771 6,628
1987 110,944 20,924 9,491 46,594 20,046 4,022 7,457 7,599
1988 108,461 19,228 12,499 50,251 24,377 4,988 7,516 9,036
1989 115,519 18,659 22,947 51,266 24,662 5,125 8,781 8,867
1990 136,414 18,617 28,476 52,747 29,798 6,483 8,892 9,472
1991 168,611 18,200 41,039 48,972 29,716 6,086 12,374 10,247
1992 204,970 20,146 50,468 44,339 31,188 8,039 13,667 11,131
1993 201,721 33,182 59,326 43,195 29,225 13,129 12,963 10,693
1994 213,937 46,093 70,367 41,515 31,009 15,414 14,425 10,754
1995 224,626 125,948 103,236 42,818 31,387 22,760 14,590 11,092
1996 233,309 112,243 100,738 37,540 29,102 26,825 13,133 9,837
1997 246,212 108,158 100,803 34,863 31,735 28,880 11,966 10,861
1998 248,862 98,847 91,705 33,734 30,075 30,646 10,735 10,660
1999 235,728 86,997 83,547 31,169 42,459 32,501 10,286 9,403
2000 218,279 76,439 73,621 27,414 45,426 31,301 11,762 8,054
Notes: Knowledge stock is
t
s=1 FCisPis(1 − δ)t−s for t = 1, . . . , T , where Pis denotes patent application count and FCis represents forward patent citations, corrected for
sample truncation bias.of R&D expenses and the associated future cash flow to equity,
since current stock prices are determined by a forward-looking
perspective of investors.
The benchmarkmodel of our empirical analysis is Pakes (1985),
who studied a panel of 120 US firms for period 1968–1975. Pakes
(1985) formulates the following system of three equations in order
to measure dynamic and simultaneous interactions among stock
return qit ; log R&D expenses rit ; log patent application count ln Pit :
 qit
rit
ln Pit

=

ϵit + η1it∞
τ=0
c2τ ϵit−τ
∞
τ=0
c3τ ϵit−τ +
∞
τ=0
b3τη3it−τ
 (4.1)
where η1it ∼ N(0, σ 21 ), ϵit ∼ N(0, σ 22 ) and η3it ∼ N(0, σ 23 )
are independent. Eq. (4.1) specifies contemporaneous and dynamicinteractions among the endogenous variables, according to a re-
stricted Vector Moving Average, VMA(∞) representation. Similar
to Pakes (1985), in each equation of Eq. (4.1), we include time ef-
fects, a dummyvariable to control for zero patent application count
and firm size. Pakes (1985) is consistent with the empirical results
of Fama (1970) and LeRoy and Porter (1981), since he uses the no
arbitrage condition to model a one-period stock return as the sum
of excess return and an uncorrelated error term. According to this
condition, the noise term process does not allow investors who use
publicly available information and simple trading rules tomake ex-
cess returns on the market. An unexpected research-related event
that shifts the value of the firm motivates managers to change the
R&D program of the firm hence R&D expenses are determined by
the weighted sum of current and past excess stock returns (ϵit). In
this model, patent applications are influenced by current and past
excess returns ϵit , and also by current and past values of an i.i.d.5
Table 4
Parameter estimates and model diagnostics for Models 1 and 2.
Model 1 Model 2
ζmatrix Residual diagnostics ζ ∗matrix Residual diagnostics
γ0 0.05*(0.032) χ2 test p-value ζ ∗11 −0.06**(0.029) χ2 test p-value
Var e1it 0.12 ζ ∗12 0.05***(0.016) Var e1it 0.12
Var e2it 0.18 ζ ∗13 −0.01(0.029) Var e2it 0.17
Var e3it 0.13 ζ ∗21 0.09***(0.018) Var e3it 0.12
ζ22 0.78***(0.032) LB test p-value ζ ∗22 0.77***(0.032) LB test p-value
LB e1it 0.50 ζ ∗23 0.02(0.025) LB e1it 0.52
LB e2it 0.49 ζ ∗31 −0.01(0.033) LB e2it 0.50
ζ32 0.05(0.032) LB e3it 0.33 ζ ∗32 0.09***(0.023) LB e3it 0.33
ζ33 0.23***(0.045) DH test p-value ζ ∗33 0.23***(0.045) DH test p-value
ρ(ζ ) 0.777 DH e1it 0.12 ρ(ζ ∗) 0.780 DH e1it 0.12
Cholesky matrix,Ω DH e2it 0.12 Cholesky matrix,Ω∗ DH e2it 0.12
σ˜1 0.63***(0.067) DH e3it 0.11 σ ∗1 0.62***(0.067) DH e3it 0.11
σ˜2 0.57***(0.036) Model diagnostics σ ∗2 0.57***(0.036) Model diagnostics
σ3 0.74***(0.025) LL −7151 σ ∗3 0.74***(0.025) LL −7132
σ˜12 0.03***(0.011) AIC 15002 σ ∗12 0.04***(0.011) AIC 14978
BIC 17032 σ ∗13 −0.01(0.019) BIC 17049
σ ∗23 0.03*(0.019) LR 37.851
LR p-value 0.000
Notes: Model 1 is Yit = ai + ζYit−1 + Ωeit with Yit = (qit , rit , ln Pit )′ . Model 2 is Yit = ai + ζ ∗Yit−1 + Ω∗eit with Yit = (qit , rit , ln Pit )′ . Ljung–Box (LB); Doornik–Hansen
(DH); Log Likelihood (LL); Akaike Information Criterion (AIC); Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC); Likelihood Ratio (LR); spectral radius ρ(·). Robust standard errors are
reported in parentheses. We report average of p-values (where the average is computed for i = 1, . . . ,N) for the χ2 test with H0: variance of errors is one; LB test with H0:
are independent; DH test with H0: errors have normal distribution. The LB test is performed for 5 lags.
* Denotes parameter significance at the 10% level.
** Denotes parameter significance at the 5% level.
*** Denotes parameter significance at the 1% level.adjustment factor that represents patent propensity η3it (Scherer,
1965a,b).
Pakes (1985) assumes that ϵit = θqit + vit so that vit and qit
are orthogonal. Then, Eq. (4.1) in the VAR(∞) representation with
contemporaneous relationships imposed can be written as
qit = ϵit + η1it
rit = c20θqit + ζ22(L)rit−1 + c20vit
ln Pit = γ0rit + ζ32(L)rit−1 + ζ33(L) ln Pit−1 + η3it .
(4.2)
To obtain a VAR(1) in structural form, we assume that the
coefficients in Eq. (4.2) satisfy that ζmτ = ζ τm for m = 22, 32, 33.
Then, Eq. (4.2) can be written in a reduced form VAR(1) as qit
rit
ln Pit

=
0 0 0
0 ζ22 0
0 γ0ζ22 + ζ32 ζ33
 qit−1
rit−1
ln Pit−1

+
 1 0 0
c20θ 1 0
c20θγ0 γ0 1

ϵit + η1it
c20vit
η3it

. (4.3)
We can also write Eq. (4.3) with a vector of standard normal i.i.d.
error terms as follows: qit
rit
ln Pit

=
0 0 0
0 ζ22 0
0 γ0ζ22 + ζ32 ζ33
 qit−1
rit−1
ln Pit−1

+

σ˜1 0 0
σ˜12 σ˜2 0
γ0σ˜12 γ0σ˜2 σ3
e1it
e2it
e3it

(4.4)
where (e1it , e2it , e3it)′ ∼ N(03×1, I3). Furthermore, σ˜1, σ˜12 and σ˜2
can be expressed by the parameters of Eq. (4.3). Eq. (4.4), derived
from Eq. (4.3) in Appendix A, is the restricted VAR(1) formulation
of Pakes (1985). The diagonal elements of the lower triangular
matrix associated to the error vector of Eq. (4.4) are positive thus
the Cholesky decomposition of the covariance matrix of errors is
unique and the covariance matrix of errors is positive definite.
Model 1. We extend the benchmark model of Pakes (1985) to a
restricted PVAR(1)model by considering fixed effects ai in Eq. (4.4): qit
rit
ln Pit

=
aq,i
ar,i
aP,i

+
0 0 0
0 ζ22 0
0 γ0ζ22 + ζ32 ζ33

  
ζ
 qit−1
rit−1
ln Pit−1

+

σ˜1 0 0
σ˜12 σ˜2 0
γ0σ˜12 γ0σ˜2 σ3

  
Ω
e1it
e2it
e3it

(4.5)
for i = 1, . . . ,N firms and t = 1, . . . , T periods. The spectral
radius of ζ , ρ(ζ ), is less than one in order to have covariance
stationary time series. We can also formulate Model 1 in a
compact matrix notation. The endogenous variables of the three-
dimensional PVAR(1) model are Yit = (qit , rit , ln Pit)′. In the PVAR
equation, fixed effects are denoted by ai = (aq,i, ar,i, aP,i)′ and
error terms are summarized by eit = (e1it , e2it , e3it)′. Then, the
model can be written as Yit = ai + ζYit−1 + Ωeit . The Impulse
Response Function (IRF) matrixΘj, derived in Appendix B, isΘj =
ζ jΩ for j = 0, . . . ,∞.
Model 2. The unrestricted PVAR(1) model with fixed effects is
given by qit
rit
ln Pit

=
aq,i
ar,i
aP,i

+

ζ ∗11 ζ
∗
12 ζ
∗
13
ζ ∗21 ζ
∗
22 ζ
∗
23
ζ ∗31 ζ
∗
32 ζ
∗
33

  
ζ∗
 qit−1
rit−1
ln Pit−1

+

σ ∗1 0 0
σ ∗12 σ
∗
2 0
σ ∗13 σ
∗
23 σ
∗
3

  
Ω∗
e1it
e2it
e3it

(4.6)
for i = 1, . . . ,N firms and t = 1, . . . , T periods, where σ ∗1 > 0,
σ ∗2 > 0, σ
∗
3 > 0, and the spectral radius of ζ
∗, ρ(ζ ∗), is less
than one. We can formulate Model 2 in a matrix notation as Yit =
ai + ζ ∗Yit−1 + Ω∗eit . The IRF matrix Θj is given by Θj = (ζ ∗)jΩ∗
for j = 0, . . . ,∞; see Appendix B.
Estimation results. Models 1 and 2 are estimated by the
Quasi-Maximum Likelihood (QML) method (Binder et al., 2005).6
Table 4 presents parameter estimates, robust standard errors and
diagnostic tests. Fig. 2 presents the off-diagonal elements of the IRF
matrix for j = 0, . . . , 20 leads.
We summarize first the model diagnostic test results. For each
firm i, for the residual time series of each endogenous variable
(i.e., estimates of e1it , e2it , e3it with t = 1, . . . , T ), we perform
the following statistical tests: (a) χ2 test with H0: variance of
errors is one; (b) Ljung and Box (1978, LB) test with H0: errors
are independent; (c) Doornik and Hansen (2008, DH) test with
H0: errors have normal distribution. For each endogenous variable,
Table 4 reports the average p-value,where the average is computed
over i = 1, . . . ,N . The table shows that on average we are not able
to rejectH0 at the 10% level of significance. Furthermore, according
to Table 4, the spectral radius of ζ is less than one for both models,
i.e., we find covariance stationary time series.
Performance of Models 1 and 2 is evaluated by likelihood-
based model selection metrics (Hamilton, 1994). Table 4 shows
that according to the Likelihood Ratio (LR) test and Akaike
Information Criterion (AIC), the more general Model 2 is preferred.
Nevertheless, according to the Bayesian Information Criterion
(BIC), the nested Model 1 is preferred. We summarize empirical
results for both specifications.
In Table 4 (panel Model 1), the parameter estimates of the ζ
matrix evidence significant Granger causality (Hamilton, 1994) of
log R&D expenses on log patent application count since γ0ζ22+ζ32
is significant. The IRF analysis of Model 1, presented in Fig. 2,
suggests a positive dynamic impact of stock return shocks on log
R&D leads (Θ21), and also positive impact of stock return shocks on
log patent application count leads (Θ31). These results are similar
to the findings of Pakes (1985, pp. 403–404). We can summarize
the IRF results as follows:
IRFs of Model 1: q
(+)−→ r (+)==⇒ ln P
where→ indicates low IRF impact and⇒ shows strong IRF impact.
From the IRF diagram of Model 1, we can see that the transmission
channel of returns to patents is through R&D investment (Pakes,
1985). Returns only affect R&D weakly and there is no feedback
effect in this model.
In Table 4 (panel Model 2), the estimates of ζ ∗ show significant
Granger causality of log R&D on stock return (ζ ∗12), stock return
on log R&D (ζ ∗21) and log R&D on log patent application count
(ζ ∗32). The IRF analysis of Model 2, presented in Fig. 2, provides
the following evidence. First, stock return shocks have positive
effects both on log R&D (Θ21) and log patent application count
(Θ31). These effects are more significant for log R&D, which are
observed contemporaneously and for all lags. For log patent counts,
the positive effects start from the second lead. Second, log R&D
expenditure shocks have significant positive impact on both stock
return (Θ12) and log patent application count (Θ32), for all leads.
We can summarize the IRF results as follows:
IRFs of Model 2: q
(+)==⇒ r (+)==⇒ ln P
q
(+)←− r (+)⇐== ln P
q
(+)−→ ln P.
The IRF diagram of Model 2 indicates that with a more flexible
model (less restricted than Model 1), the connection between
returns and R&D is stronger. Furthermore, there is a strong
feedback from patent applications to R&D and a weak impact of
R&D on the stock return of the firm, which are transmitted to
patent applications. All these effects are positive.
4.2. Patented and non-patented R&D activity
We use the latent-factor patent count panel data model of
Blazsek and Escribano (2010) to estimate patented and non-
patented R&D activities of firms. This model involves a dynamicspecification for patent propensity. We model the conditional dis-
tribution of patent application count Pit of firm i in period t by the
Poisson distribution with heterogeneous patent application inten-
sity parameter λit = PoitP∗it (Hausman et al., 1984). In our model,
Poit is the R&D output of firm i in period t and P
∗
it ∈ (0, 1) is the
patent propensity of firm i in period t . P∗it measures the proportion
of patent applications, which result from an innovation of a given
quality. P∗it adjusts R&D activity for trade secrecy instead of reveal-
ing R&D information by patents (Kahn, 1962; Machlup, 1962) or
the absorptive capacity of rents from R&D (Scherer, 1965b; Arora
et al., 2008). If P∗it ≃ 1, then λit ≃ Poit and the total R&D activity will
be submitted to the patent office. However, in general, only part
of the R&D activity generates patents therefore λit = PoitP∗it . If P∗it
is higher, then absorptive capacity of the firm will be higher or the
portion of innovation productivity kept secret will be lower (Es-
cribano et al., 2009). Furthermore, (1− P∗it) ∈ (0, 1) is the propen-
sity not to patent of firm i in period t , which is determined by the
common latent factor of the technological cluster. (1 − P∗it) indi-
cates the propensity of R&D investment decisions that do not gen-
erate patent applications. (1 − P∗it) represents non-appropriated
R&D activity and adjusts R&D investment decisions for trade se-
crecy in order to avoid the disclosure of the information included
in patent applications to competitors. We define the R&D output
that does not generate patent applications (non-patented R&D ac-
tivity) by P×it = Poit(1− P∗it).
The conditional probability mass function of patent application
count Pit is
f (Pit |Ft) = exp(−λit)(λit)
Pit
Pit ! =
exp(−PoitP∗it)(PoitP∗it)Pit
Pit ! (4.7)
for i = 1, . . . ,N firms and t = 1, . . . , T periods (for period
1979–2000). The conditioning set is
Ft = [(Pi1, ri1, BVi1, BCintra,i1, BCinter,i1, l∗1), . . . ,
(Pit−1, rit−1, BVit−1, BCintra,it−1, BCinter,it−1, l∗t−1),
(rit , BVit , BCintra,it , BCinter,it , l∗t ) : i = 1, . . . ,N]
(4.8)
where rit denotes log of R&D expenditure; BVit is log of book
value of equity; BCintra,it is the number of patent citations to past
patents of other firms in the technological cluster (intra-cluster
backward citations); BCinter,it is the number of backward citations
to past patents of non-technologically-related firms, i.e., firms not
in the technological cluster (inter-cluster backward citations); l∗t
is a common latent factor that drives patent propensity in the
technological cluster.
Model 3. We specify the conditional expectation of Pit by a
patent count panel data model, which is a combination of Poisson
and probit models with latent common factor, as follows:
E(Pit |Ft) = λit = PoitP∗it (4.9)
ln Poit = µ0 + γ1t + γ2trit + γ3r2it + γ4BVit
+ γ5Pi1 +
q
k=0
βkrit−k +
q
k=0
ωkBCintra,it−krit
+
q
k=0
φkBCinter,it−krit +
p
k=1
κk ln Poit−k (4.10)
ln P∗it = lnΦ(µi + σil∗t ) (4.11)
l∗t = µ∗l∗t−1 + ut with ut ∼ N(0, 1) i.i.d. (4.12)
Eq. (4.10) specifies the log R&D activity component ln Poit .
We generate R&D activity, Poit , based on actual and past values
of R&D expenditure adjusted for innovation quality (backward
citations), past innovation outputs and the initial condition on
patent applications. In Eq. (4.10), µ0 is the constant parameter; γ1
and γ2 control for linear time trend; γ3 captures non-linearities7
Fig. 2. Off-diagonal elements of the IRF matrixΘj for Models 1 and 2 for j = 0, . . . , 20 leads. Notes: The confidence band is defined byΘ j ± 2σ(Θj).in log R&D expenditure; γ4 measures the impact of firm size;
γ5 controls for initial conditions; βk with k = 0, . . . , q capture
finite distributed lag effects of log R&D expenses; ωk and φk with
k = 0, . . . , q control interactions of finite distributed lags of intra-
cluster and inter-cluster backward citations, respectively, and
current log R&D expenses; κk controls for AR dynamics (Blazsek
and Escribano, 2010).
Eq. (4.11) specifies the patent propensity component P∗it
according to a probit model. In this equation, Φ is the cumulative
distribution function of the standard normal distribution; µi is
firm-specific fixed effect; σi ∈ R is a firm-specific scaling
parameter for the common latent factor, l∗t .
Eq. (4.12) specifies the common latent factor of the technologi-
cal cluster l∗t that affects all firms. l∗t is an aggregate index of tech-
nological cluster characteristics in period t , which represents the
degree of market competition, degree of deregulation, degree of
enforcement of intellectual property rights and degree of informa-
tion that is common knowledge. In Eq. (4.12), |µ∗| < 1 measures
the average persistence of the latent factor in the technological
cluster. The constant term in this equation is restricted to zero and
the dynamic parameter µ∗ is assumed to be the same for all firms,
since these are determined by common knowledge on technolog-
ical cluster characteristics. These restrictions also help parameter
identification. We extend the specification of Pakes (1985), since
the propensity to patent time series {P∗it : t = 1, . . . , T } for firm
i is serially correlated and driven by the dynamic latent common
factor of the technological cluster. Nevertheless, P∗it is firm-specific
due to the level and scaling parameters µi and σi, respectively.
Estimation results. We estimate the latent-factor patent count
data model by the Simulated ML (SML) method, applying the
Efficient Importance Sampling (EIS) technique of Richard and
Zhang (2007). Appendix C presents thismethod. Other applications
of EIS are Liesenfeld and Richard (2003), Bauwens and Hautsch
(2006) and Blazsek and Escribano (2010). EIS is a refinement of therecursive importance sampling algorithm of Keane (1994), with
respect to the construction of the source distribution of the draws
in a way that gives greater efficiency. Robust standard errors of
parameters are computed by the sandwich estimator (Davidson
and MacKinnon, 2009).
Parameter estimates, robust standard errors and model diag-
nostic tests are presented in the first panel of Table 5. This table
shows that the latent common factor is covariance stationary with
µ∗ = 0.91. Fig. 1(a) presents the evolution of total patent applica-
tion count
N
i=1 Pit and total patent application intensity
N
i=1 λit
in the technological cluster for period1979–2000. The figure shows
that the latent-factor patent count panel data model fits well with
patent application count time series, for most years. The only ex-
ceptions are 1995 and 1996, when significant differences are ob-
served between patent counts and fitted patent intensity. These
outliers may partly be due to the implementation of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade on 8 June 1995, which influenced
effective pharmaceutical patent life (Grabowski andVernon, 2000).
The outliers in 1995 and 1996 may also be due to significant shifts
in the level of market competition (see Section 5, which supports
this idea).
We compute filtered estimates of the latent common factor by
estimating E[l∗t |F ot ] for all t . In this expectation, we condition on
the following observable information set:
F ot = [(Pi1, ri1, BVi1, BCintra,i1, BCinter,i1), . . . ,
(Pit−1, rit−1, BVit−1, BCintra,it−1, BCinter,it−1),
(rit , BVit , BCintra,it , BCinter,it) : i = 1, . . . ,N].
(4.13)
The estimation of E[l∗t |F ot ] involves the ratio of two high-
dimensional integrals, each evaluated by the EIS technique.
Appendix D presents the computation of E[l∗t |F ot ]. The evolution
of the latent common factor for period 1979–2000 is presented
in Fig. 1(c). The figure shows that the unobservable common8
Table 5
Parameter estimates and model diagnostics for Models 3 and 6.
rit−k BCintra,it−krit BCinter,it−krit Diagnostics
Model 3: Poisson and probit models with latent common factor
µ0 0.50***(0.090) β0 0.63***(0.016) ω0 0.00**(0.000) φ0 0.00(0.000) LL −3741
γ1t 0.14***(0.002) β1 −0.04***(0.009) ω1 0.00(0.000) φ1 0.00(0.000) AIC 8007
γ2trit −0.01***(0.001) β2 0.02***(0.007) ω2 0.00(0.000) φ2 0.00(0.000) BIC 8294
γ3r2it −0.04***(0.003) β3 −0.03***(0.004) ω3 0.00(0.001) φ3 0.00(0.000) LR 255.288
γ4BVit 0.01***(0.001) β4 −0.03***(0.002) ω4 0.00(0.001) φ4 0.00(0.000) LR p 0.000
γ5Pi1 0.05***(0.001) β5 0.03***(0.005) ω5 0.00(0.001) φ5 0.00(0.001)
κ1 0.00(0.000) β6 −0.01***(0.002) ω6 0.00(0.004) φ6 0.00(0.001)
µ∗ 0.91***(0.007) β7 −0.01***(0.002) ω7 0.00(0.005) φ7 0.00(0.004)
β8 −0.01***(0.002) ω8 0.01(0.005) φ8 0.00(0.007)
β9 −0.01(0.006) ω9 0.00(0.006) φ9 0.00(0.007)
β10 0.02***(0.008) ω10 0.01(0.007) φ10 −0.01(0.013)
Model 6: Poisson and probit models with observable competition factor
µ0 0.83***(0.080) β0 0.51***(0.021) ω0 0.00*(0.000) φ0 0.00(0.000) LL −3868
γ1t 0.15***(0.004) β1 −0.05***(0.007) ω1 0.00(0.000) φ1 0.00(0.000) AIC 8262
γ2trit −0.01***(0.001) β2 0.02**(0.007) ω2 0.00(0.000) φ2 0.00(0.000) BIC 8549
γ3r2it −0.04***(0.003) β3 −0.04***(0.007) ω3 0.00(0.001) φ3 0.00(0.000)
γ4BVit 0.01***(0.002) β4 −0.01**(0.007) ω4 0.00(0.001) φ4 0.00(0.000)
γ5Pi1 0.07***(0.002) β5 0.02**(0.008) ω5 0.00(0.001) φ5 0.00(0.001)
κ1 0.00(0.000) β6 −0.02***(0.007) ω6 0.00(0.003) φ6 0.00(0.001)
µ∗ 0.84***(0.126) β7 −0.02***(0.008) ω7 0.00(0.005) φ7 0.00(0.005)
µ∗0 0.15(0.112) β8 −0.02***(0.006) ω8 0.01(0.005) φ8 0.00(0.007)
β9 −0.01*(0.007) ω9 0.00(0.006) φ9 0.00(0.007)
β10 0.03***(0.007) ω10 0.01(0.007) φ10 −0.01(0.013)
Notes: Model 3 is specified as λit = PoitP∗it where ln Poit = µ0+γ1t+γ2trit +γ3r2it +γ4BVit +γ5Pi1+
10
k=0 βkrit−k+
10
k=0 ωkBCintra,it−krit +
10
k=0 φkBCinter,it−krit +κ1 ln Poit−1 ,
ln P∗it = lnΦ(µi + σil∗t ) and l∗t = µ∗l∗t−1 + ut . Model 6 is λit = PoitP∗it where ln Poit = µ0 + γ1t + γ2trit + γ3r2it + γ4BVit + γ5Pi1 +
10
k=0 βkrit−k +
10
k=0 ωkBCintra,it−krit +10
k=0 φkBCinter,it−krit + κ1 ln Poit−1 , ln P∗it = lnΦ(µi + σiCOt ) and COt = µ∗0 + µ∗CO∗t−1 + ut . Log Likelihood (LL); Akaike Information Criterion (AIC); Bayesian Information
Criterion (BIC); Likelihood Ratio (LR); LR p is the p-value of the LR test. We use the non-nested LR test of Vuong (1989). We do not report the estimates of µi and σi . Robust
standard errors are reported in parentheses.
* Denotes parameter significance at the 10% level.
** Denotes parameter significance at the 5% level.
*** Denotes parameter significance at the and 1% level.factor decreases until 1990 and rapidly increases to a higher level
afterwards.
Fig. 1(f) presents the evolution of mean patent propensity
(1/N)
N
i=1 P
∗
it in the technological cluster for period 1979–2000.
The figure shows that during the 1990s, the percentage of patent
applications increased from about 7.2% to above 10%. For 1996
and 1997, we see outliers for this variable but afterwards the level
stabilizes above 10%.
Fig. 3 presents first and second-order polynomial regression re-
sults about the determinants of patent propensity in the techno-
logical cluster. The figure shows fitted values of (1/T )
T
t=1 ln P
∗
it
for i = 1, . . . ,N firms, regressed on the mean of the variables
(V1), (V2), (V5) and (V7) computed for period 1979–2000. The fig-
ure exhibits the estimates of the regression model fitted to mean
ln P∗it and the corresponding R-squared values, in order to inform
about the explanatory power of each variable. Fig. 3(a) shows an
inverted-U relationship for log of mean patent application count
(V1) andmean log patent propensity. Formost firms in the techno-
logical cluster, higher patent application count is associated with
higher patent propensity level. Nevertheless, for some firms with
a high number of patent applications, we see that patent propen-
sity is relatively low. Fig. 3(b) shows a linear increasing relation be-
tween log mean citations received count (V2) andmean log patent
propensity. Similar to Fig. 3(a), we see that some firms with a high
number of citations received from subsequent patents, exhibit rel-
atively low patent propensity. Fig. 3(c) shows an inverted-U re-
lationship for mean log R&D expenses (V5) and mean log patent
propensity. For most firms in the technological cluster, higher R&D
expenses are associated with higher patent propensity. Neverthe-
less, some firms that exhibit high R&D expenditure have a rel-
atively low patent propensity. Fig. 3(d) shows a positive linear
relation between mean log stock market value and log patentpropensity. We also see that a high level of patent propensity is
significantly associated with high firm value.
4.3. Extended innovation and market value model
We use the estimates of Poit and P
∗
it and extend the unrestricted
three-dimensional innovation and market value Model 2, by
proposing a four-dimensional dynamic model for stock return qit ;
log R&D expenses rit ; log patent application count ln Pit ; log non-
patented R&D activity ln P×it = Poit(1− P∗it).
Model 4. The unrestricted PVAR(1) model with fixed effects is
given by qitritln Pit
ln P×it
 =
aq,iar,iaP,i
a×,i
+
ζ
∗
11 ζ
∗
12 ζ
∗
13 ζ
∗
14
ζ ∗21 ζ
∗
22 ζ
∗
23 ζ
∗
24
ζ ∗31 ζ
∗
32 ζ
∗
33 ζ
∗
34
ζ ∗41 ζ
∗
42 ζ
∗
43 ζ
∗
44

  
ζ∗
 qit−1rit−1ln Pit−1
ln P×it−1

+
σ
∗
1 0 0 0
σ ∗12 σ
∗
2 0 0
σ ∗13 σ
∗
23 σ
∗
3 0
σ ∗14 σ
∗
24 σ
∗
34 σ
∗
4

  
Ω∗
e1ite2ite3it
e4it
 (4.14)
for i = 1, . . . ,N firms and t = 1, . . . , T periods, where
(e1it , e2it , e3it , e4it)′ ∼ N(04×1, I4), and the spectral radius of ζ ∗,
ρ(ζ ∗), is less than one. The diagonal elements of Ω∗ are positive
thus the Cholesky decomposition of the covariancematrix of errors
is unique and the covariancematrix of errors is positive definite. In
each equation of Eq. (4.14), we include time effects, a zero patent
application count dummy and firm size (Pakes, 1985).We consider
the same variables in the PVAR model that measures spillovers9
(a) Patent application count. (b) Citations received count.
(c) R&D expenses. (d) Stock market value of equity.
Fig. 3. Determinants of patent propensity. Notes: The figure shows the fitted values of (1/T )
T
t=1 ln P
∗
it for i = 1, . . . ,N . First and second order polynomial regressions are
estimated by least squares. The definition of each explanatory variable is presented in Table 2.in Section 4.4.2 The endogenous variables of the four-dimensional
PVAR(1) model are Yit = (qit , rit , ln Pit , ln P×it )′. In the PVAR
equation, fixed effects are denoted by ai = (aq,i, ar,i, aP,i, a×,i)′
and error terms are summarized by eit = (e1it , e2it , e3it , e4it)′. We
can formulate Model 4 in a compact matrix notation as Yit =
ai + ζ ∗Yit−1 + Ω∗eit . The IRF matrix Θj, derived in Appendix B,
is given byΘj = (ζ ∗)jΩ∗ for j = 0, . . . ,∞.
Estimation results. Model 4 is estimated by the QML method.
Table 6 (Model 4 panel) presents the parameter estimates, robust
standard errors and model diagnostics. Fig. 4 presents the off-
diagonal elements of the IRF matrix for j = 0, . . . , 20 leads.
According to the residual diagnostic tests, on average, we are not
able to reject model specification assumptions at the 10% level
of significance. Furthermore, we find that Model 4 is covariance
stationary.
The IFR figures ofModel 4 show similar effects among qit , rit and
ln Pit as in Model 2 (see Figs. 2 and 4). We focus on those IRFs that
involve non-patented R&D activity ln P×it . Fig. 4 shows that stock
return (Θ41), log R&D expenses (Θ42) and log patent count (Θ43)
shocks have a positive impact on log non-patented R&D activity.
Furthermore, Fig. 4 also shows that the effects of log non-patented
R&D activity shocks on other variables (Θ14, Θ24, and Θ34) are
less significant although the IRF is positive on average. We can
2 We also estimate restricted four-dimensional PVAR model similar to that of
Pakes (1985). Blazsek and Escribano (2014) report these results. As we obtain
results for the restricted four-dimensionalmodel that are similar to the unrestricted
four-dimensional model (and moreover, as all likelihood-based model selection
criteria support the unrestricted model), in this work we only report results for the
unrestricted four-dimensional innovation and market value model.summarize the IRF results as follows:
IRF of Model 4: q
(+)==⇒ r (+)==⇒ ln P (+)←→ ln P× (+)⇐⇒ latent common factor
q
(+)←− r (+)⇐==

ln P
ln P× (+)⇐⇒ latent common factor
q
(+)−→ ln P
where→ indicates low IRF impact and⇒ shows strong IRF impact.
Two-way arrows indicate feedback (low impact is denoted by↔
and high impact is denoted by ⇔). The flow diagram of Model 4
has similar transmission channels as Model 2, but it also includes
a new component related to the common latent component,
associatedwith the patent propensity. Patent propensity enhances
the relation with R&D through the feedback with the R&D-related
component of patent applications. Furthermore, patent propensity
is highly and positively correlated with the latent common factor
(see Section 5).
4.4. Extended model for patent innovation leaders and followers
We consider different interaction effects (spillovers) among
stock return qit , log R&D expenses rit , log patent application
count ln Pit and log non-patented R&D activity ln P×it for patent
innovation leaders and followers of the technological cluster. We
formulate this model by using a compact matrix notation.
Model 5. The unrestricted PVAR(1)model for IL and IFwith fixed
effects, is given by
Yit = ai + ζ ∗Yit−1 + ζ ∗ILYIL,t−1Dit(i ∈ IF)
+ ζ ∗IF

k∈IF
Ykt−1

Dit(i = IL)+Ω∗eit (4.15)10
Table 6
Parameter estimates and model diagnostics for Models 4 and 5.
Model 4 Model 5
ζ ∗matrix Residual diagnostics ζ ∗matrix ζ ∗ILmatrix Residual diagnostics
ζ ∗11 −0.06**(0.029) χ2 test p-value ζ ∗11 −0.07**(0.033) ζ ∗IL,11 0.06(0.103) χ2 test p-value
ζ ∗12 0.04***(0.015) Var e1it 0.12 ζ
∗
12 0.04(0.039) ζ
∗
IL,12 −0.54***(0.138) Var e1it 0.14
ζ ∗13 −0.01(0.030) Var e2it 0.17 ζ ∗13 −0.01(0.026) ζ ∗IL,13 −3.47(9.555) Var e2it 0.17
ζ ∗14 0.00(0.016) Var e3it 0.12 ζ
∗
14 0.00(0.133) ζ
∗
IL,14 0.87
***(0.197) Var e3it 0.17
ζ ∗21 0.09***(0.018) Var e4it 0.10 ζ
∗
21 0.08
**(0.036) ζ ∗IL,21 −0.12(0.092) Var e4it 0.10
ζ ∗22 0.77***(0.039) LB test p-value ζ
∗
22 0.75
***(0.021) ζ ∗IL,22 0.05(0.141) LB test p-value
ζ ∗23 0.02(0.025) LB e1it 0.51 ζ
∗
23 0.06
**(0.026) ζ ∗IL,23 −4.45(11.771) LB e1it 0.50
ζ ∗24 −0.01(0.120) LB e2it 0.49 ζ ∗24 0.07*(0.038) ζ ∗IL,24 1.12***(0.193) LB e2it 0.49
ζ ∗31 −0.01(0.034) LB e3it 0.34 ζ ∗31 0.02(0.029) ζIL,31* −0.17*(0.100) LB e3it 0.33
ζ ∗32 0.09***(0.024) LB e4it 0.14 ζ
∗
32 0.09
***(0.035) ζ ∗IL,32 −0.10(0.100) LB e4it 0.25
ζ ∗33 0.23***(0.045) DH test p-value ζ
∗
33 0.19
***(0.019) ζ ∗IL,33 4.20(11.215) DH test p-value
ζ ∗34 0.02(0.028) DH e1it 0.11 ζ
∗
34 0.07(0.111) ζ
∗
IL,34 −0.77***(0.195) DH e1it 0.11
ζ ∗41 0.03***(0.008) DH e2it 0.12 ζ
∗
41 0.02(0.018) ζ
∗
IL,41 −0.05*(0.032) DH e2it 0.12
ζ ∗42 0.00(0.016) DH e3it 0.12 ζ
∗
42 −0.02**(0.008) ζ ∗IL,42 0.22***(0.056) DH e3it 0.15
ζ ∗43 0.01(0.011) DH e4it 0.21 ζ
∗
43 0.04
***(0.012) ζ ∗IL,43 −1.32(3.376) DH e4it 0.22
ζ ∗44 0.31***(0.085) Model diagnostics ζ
∗
44 0.41
***(0.012) ζ ∗IL,44 0.36***(0.076) Model diagnostics
ρ(ζ ∗) 0.78 LL −6956 ρ(ζ ∗) 0.763 ζ ∗IFmatrix LL −6597
Cholesky matrix,Ω∗ AIC 14876 Cholesky matrix,Ω∗ ζ ∗IF,11 0.00(0.253) AIC 14221
σ ∗1 0.62***(0.067) BIC 17672 σ
∗
1 0.62
***(0.005) ζ ∗IF,12 −0.01(0.337) BIC 17202
σ ∗2 0.57***(0.036) σ
∗
2 0.55
***(0.009) ζ ∗IF,13 0.00(0.140) LR 718.925
σ ∗3 0.74***(0.025) σ
∗
3 0.72
***(0.012) ζ ∗IF,14 0.00(0.711) LR p-value 0.000
σ ∗4 0.22***(0.016) σ
∗
4 0.21
***(0.002) ζ ∗IF,21 0.00(0.959)
σ ∗12 0.04***(0.011) σ
∗
12 0.02(0.028) ζ
∗
IF,22 0.00(0.406)
σ ∗13 −0.01(0.019) σ ∗13 0.00(0.023) ζ ∗IF,23 0.00(0.252)
σ ∗23 0.03*(0.018) σ
∗
23 0.06
**(0.026) ζ ∗IF,24 0.01(1.255)
σ ∗14 0.01***(0.005) σ
∗
14 0.01(0.018) ζ
∗
IF,31 0.00(1.180)
σ ∗24 0.14***(0.016) σ
∗
24 0.13
***(0.006) ζ ∗IF,32 0.00(1.363)
σ ∗34 0.01**(0.004) σ
∗
34 0.01(0.013) ζ
∗
IF,33 0.00(1.523)
ζ ∗IF,34 0.01(2.708)
ζ ∗IF,41 0.00(0.307)
ζ ∗IF,42 0.00(0.104)
ζ ∗IF,43 0.00(0.044)
ζ ∗IF,44 0.01(0.339)
Notes: Model 4 is Yit = ai + ζ ∗Yit−1 +Ω∗eit with Yit = (qit , rit , ln Pit , ln P×it )′ . Model 5 is Yit = ai + ζ ∗Yit−1 + ζ ∗ILYIL,t−1Dit (i ∈ IF)+ ζ ∗IF

k∈IF Ykt−1

Dit (i = IL)+Ω∗eit with
Yit = (qit , rit , ln Pit , ln P×it )′ . Ljung–Box (LB); Doornik–Hansen (DH); Log Likelihood (LL); Akaike Information Criterion (AIC); Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC); Likelihood
Ratio (LR); spectral radius ρ(·). Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. We report average of p-values (where the average is computed over i = 1, . . . ,N) for
the χ2 test with H0: variance of errors is one; LB test with H0: errors are independent; DH test with H0: errors have normal distribution. The LB test is performed for 5 lags.
* Denotes parameter significance at the 10% level.
** Denotes parameter significance at the 5% level.
*** Denotes parameter significance at the 1% level.for i = 1, . . . ,N firms and t = 1, . . . , T periods, where ζ ∗, ζ ∗IL
and ζ ∗IF are unrestricted.3 The spectral radius of ζ ∗ is less than one.
Ω∗ is a lower triangular matrix with positive diagonal elements.
Appendix B shows that the IRF matrix Θj is Θj = (ζ ∗)jΩ∗ for
j = 0, . . . ,∞, and the matrices of dynamic interaction multipliers
are
Γj(IL→ IF) = (effects of YIL,t−j on Yit for i ∈ IF)
= (ζ ∗)jζ ∗IL for j = 0, 1, 2, . . . ,∞ (4.16)
Γj(IF→ IL) = (effects of Yk,t−j on YIL,t for k ∈ IF)
= (ζ ∗)jζ ∗IF for j = 0, 1, 2, . . . ,∞ . (4.17)
Estimation results. Model 5 is estimated by the QML method.
Table 6 (Model 5 panel) presents the parameter estimates, robust
standard errors and diagnostic test results. Fig. 5 presents the off-
diagonal elements of the IRF matrix for j = 0, . . . , 20 leads. Fig. 6
3 We also estimate restricted four-dimensional PVAR model similar to that of
Pakes (1985) with patent innovation leaders and followers. Blazsek and Escribano
(2014) report these results. As we obtain results for the restricted four-dimensional
model that are similar to the unrestricted four-dimensional model (and moreover,
as all likelihood-based model selection criteria support the unrestricted model), in
this work we only report results for the unrestricted four-dimensional innovation
and market value model with patent innovation leaders and followers.presents the matrix of dynamic interaction multipliers from IL to
IFs for j = 0, . . . , 20 leads.
According to the residual diagnostic tests, on average we are
not able to reject the model specification assumptions at the 10%
level of significance. We find that Model 5 is covariance stationary.
Moreover, Table 6 shows that Model 5 is superior to Model 4 with
respect to the likelihood-based model performance metrics.
The IRFs of Model 5 show similar dynamic effects to the IRFs
of Model 4. In the remaining part of this section, we focus on
the dynamic effects among the patent innovation leader and
its followers. Fig. 6 shows the dynamic interaction multipliers
measuring spillovers from the IL (Merck) to IF companies, and
provides the following results. First, we see positive spillover
effects of all IL variables on IF stock return, starting from the first
and second leads (see Γ11, Γ12, Γ13, and Γ14). The highest spillover
effects are associated with the IL’s log patent application count
and log non-patented R&D activity on IF firms’ stock returns. We
can also see that IL’s log R&D expenses have a contemporaneous
negative effect on IFs’ stock return. However, this effect changes
to positive sign from the first lead (see Γ12). Second, we see
significant positive dynamic effects of IL’s log non-patented R&D
activity on IFs’ log R&D expenses (Γ24) and non-patented R&D
activity (Γ44). For both variables, Fig. 6 shows a clear spillover
pattern, over several years. Third, Γ34 shows that IL’s log non-
patented R&D activity have negative contemporaneous effect on11
Fig. 4. Off-diagonal elements of the IRF matrixΘj for Model 4 for j = 0, . . . , 20 leads. Notes: The confidence band is defined byΘ j ± 2σ(Θj).Dynamic multipliers of Model 5: qIL
(+)−→ qIF
rIL
(+)==⇒ ln PIF (+)←→ ln P×IF (+)⇐⇒ latent common factor
ln PIL
(+)==⇒ ln PIF (+)←→ ln P×IF (+)⇐⇒ latent common factor
ln P×IL
(+)==⇒ rIF (+)⇐⇒ ln PIF (+)←→ ln P×IF (+)⇐⇒ latent common factor.
Box I.IFs’ log patent application count. Nevertheless, from the first lead
this effect changes to positive sign for all subsequent years. Fourth,
we observe positive dynamic effects of IL’s log R&D expenses on
IFs’ non-patented R&D activity (see Γ42). These findings suggest
positive dynamic R&D spillovers from IL (Merck) to IF firms. For
R&D (IL) and stock return (IF), and log non-patented R&D (IL) and
log patent application (IF) count relations, we observe negativecontemporaneous effects from IL to IF firms that change to positive
sign for all leading years. Moreover, the results also evidence
that IF firms are more influenced by the log non-patented R&D
activity of Merck than by its log patent application count, which
emphasizes the importance of measuring the non-patented R&D
activity. Dynamic interaction multiplier effects are summarized in
Box I.12
We do not report the matrix of dynamic interaction multipliers
from IF to IL firms, since none of the ζ ∗IF coefficients were found to
be significantly different fromzero (see Table 6).We also estimated
the restricted Model 5 with ζ ∗IF = 0 and performed the LR test to
compare unrestricted and restricted versions of Model 5. We find
that log-likelihood of these models does not differ significantly.
5. Competition and patent propensity
In this section, we discuss our results in the context of the
competition and innovation model of Aghion et al. (2005). We
assess the level of competition by the observable measure
COt = 1− 1N
N
i=1
LIit
= 1− 1
N
N
i=1
operating profitit − financial costsit
salesit
(5.1)
where LIit is the Lerner index or price cost margin, whichmeasures
the degree of market power of firm i in period t (Nickell, 1996;
Aghion et al., 2005). High values of this competition measure
indicate competitive industry, while low values indicate market
power.
5.1. Latent common factor versus observable competition factor
We study how the latent common factor, that drives patent
propensity of firms, is related to the degree of competition in the
technological cluster. First,we estimate an alternative patent count
data model that considers COt as the common factor of patent
propensity, replacing l∗t . Second, we present some descriptive
statistics comparing l∗t and COt , for period 1979–2000, in order
to provide additional arguments about the strong relationship
between the latent common factor and COt .
Model 6. We specify the conditional expectation of Pit by a
patent count datamodel that is a combination of Poisson andprobit
models with observable competition factor, as follows:
E(Pit |F ot , COt) = λit = PoitP∗it (5.2)
ln Poit = µ0 + γ1t + γ2trit + γ3r2it + γ4BVit
+ γ5Pi1 +
q
k=0
βkrit−k +
q
k=0
ωkBCintra,it−krit
+
q
k=0
φkBCinter,it−krit +
p
k=1
κk ln Poit−k (5.3)
ln P∗it = lnΦ(µi + σiCOt) (5.4)
COt = µ∗0 + µ∗CO∗t−1 + ut (5.5)
where ut is an uncorrelated white noise process. The system
of equations (5.2)–(5.4) is estimated by the ML method. The
parameters of Eq. (5.5) are estimated by a separate AR(1) equation
in order to compare the dynamics of the common factor between
the two models. Parameter estimates, robust standard errors
obtained by the sandwich estimator and model diagnostics are
reported in the second panel of Table 5. By comparing the two
patent application count data models of Table 5, we can see that
estimation results are very similar. The same sign and similar
level of significance are observed for each parameter. This result
supports that the latent common factor is highly correlated with
the degree of market competition.
The likelihood-based model performance metrics presented
in Table 5 show that the latent-factor patent count data
model dominates the patent count data model with observablecompetition factor. This is due to the fact that the latent common
factor captures additional common characteristics besides the
degree ofmarket competition (for example, degree of deregulation,
degree of enforcement of intellectual property rights or degree
of information that is common knowledge in the technological
cluster). This finding supports the application of the latent-factor
model to separate patented and non-patented R&D activity.
Additional arguments. We present the total intensity estimatesN
i=1 λit for each model in Fig. 1(a)–(b). These figures show
that both models provide similar approximation of total patent
application count for period 1979–2000. Moreover, Fig. 1(c)–(d)
also shows that the latent common factor and the level of market
competition have a similar tendency for period 1979–2000, and
they rise rapidly around 1990. This suggests that pharmaceutical
firms reacted to the increasing level of market competition by
patenting a significantly higher proportion of their innovation
output after 1990.
5.2. Inverted-U relationship between competition and innovation
We study whether the inverted-U relationship between com-
petition and innovation, implied by the theory of Aghion et al.
(2005), exists in the pharmaceutical technological cluster. We use
three measures of overall innovation in the technological cluster:
mean patent application count (1/N)
N
i=1 Pit ; mean R&D activity
(1/N)
N
i=1 P
o
it ; mean non-patented R&D activity (1/N)
N
i=1 P
×
it .
Moreover,we also study the relationship between competition and
mean patent propensity (1/N)
N
i=1 P
∗
it . We estimate two models
to competition and innovation data. First, Fig. 7 shows the esti-
mates of a polynomial regression model that suggest an inverted-
U relationship between competition COt and the innovation
variables considered (Aghion et al., 2005). Second, as the figure
shows two groups of data points, we also fit a logistic function. The
fitted values indicate two clusters in Fig. 7. The cluster with lower
degree of competition and lower level of innovation corresponds to
data observed for period 1979–1991, while the cluster with higher
degree of competition and higher level of innovation is for period
1992–2000. (Fig. 1(d) also shows that the degree of market com-
petition COt in the technological cluster increases for the sample
period, with a significant jump in the beginning of the 1990s.) Fur-
thermore, Fig. 7(d) suggests that in the technological cluster, on av-
erage, as the level of competition increases, the proportion of R&D
activity that generates patents also increases. The estimates of the
logistic function in Fig. 7(d) suggest that pharmaceutical firms gen-
erate patents from a higher proportion of the R&D activity from the
beginning of the 1990s. It is important to note that due to the small
number of data points the results reported in this section are only
suggestive.
5.3. Neck-and-neck firms in innovation activity
The dynamic effects reported in Fig. 6 indicate spillovers from
the IL firm (Merck) to IFs. The estimation results show that
Merck has rapid contemporaneous impact on followers, while IFs
do not impact significantly Merck. The model of Aghion et al.
(2005) implies that increasing market competition discourages
laggard firms to innovate, while it encourages neck-and-neck
firms to innovate. The positive dynamic spillover effects estimated
in the drugs industry indicate that, in the technological cluster
analyzed, firms on average are neck-and-neck in innovation
activity for period 1979–2000. The spillover dynamics found are
consistent with Nabseth and Ray (1974), Mansfield et al. (1981),
Rogers (1983), Pakes and Schankerman (1984) and Jovanovic
and MacDonald (1994), who report that innovation spills over
gradually to competitors.13
Fig. 5. Off-diagonal elements of the IRF matrixΘj for Model 5 for j = 0, . . . , 20 leads. Notes: The confidence band is defined byΘ j ± 2σ(Θj).5.4. Competition and technological distance of leaders and followers
We study an implication of the theory of Aghion et al. (2005)
for the pharmaceutical technological cluster, who suggest that the
average technological distance between innovation leaders and
followers increaseswith competition. Aghion et al. (2005)measure
technological gap based on total factor productivity. In the present
article, we use four alternative innovation-related variables in
order to approximate technological distance between the IL and IFs
of the technological cluster: (a) knowledge stock of firm i in period
t , denoted by KSit = ts=1 FCisPis(1 − δ)t−s; (b) R&D activity Poit
of firm i in period t; (c) patent propensity P∗it of firm i in period
t; (d) non-patented R&D activity P×it of firm i in period t . By using
the general innovation activity IAit notation for variables (a)–(d),
we approximate technological distance TDt in the pharmaceutical
technological cluster by the following measure (which is also usedby (Aghion et al., 2005)):
TDt = 1N
N
i=1
IAIL,t − IAit
IAIL,t
. (5.6)
Model 7. We estimate the linear regression model that controls
for a non-linear time trend:
TDt = β0 + β1t + β2t2 + β3COt + ut (5.7)
for t = 1, . . . , T . Robust OLS estimates with Heteroskedasticity
and Autocorrelation Consistent (HAC) standard errors (Newey and
West, 1987) are presented in Table 7. We find that competition
has a significant positive effect on technological distance for
all measures of innovation activity. This finding supports the
implication of the model of Aghion et al. (2005).14
Fig. 6. Dynamic multiplier matrix Γj(IL→ IF) for Model 5 for j = 0, . . . , 20 leads. Notes: The confidence band is defined by Γ j ± 2σ(Γj).Table 7
Parameter estimates and model diagnostics for Model 7.
TDt (KSit : i = 1, . . . ,N) TDt (Poit : i = 1, . . . ,N) TDt (P∗it : i = 1, . . . ,N) TDt (P×it : i = 1, . . . ,N)
β0 0.97***(0.005) β0 0.92***(0.019) β0 −0.10**(0.045) β0 0.93***(0.016)
β1t 0.00***(0.000) β1t 0.00(0.000) β1t 0.00**(0.001) β1t 0.00(0.000)
β2t2 0.00*(0.000) β2t2 0.00***(0.000) β2t2 0.00**(0.000) β2t2 0.00***(0.000)
β3COt 0.02***(0.006) β3COt 0.05**(0.023) β3COt 0.22***(0.057) β3COt 0.05**(0.021)
Model diagnostics Model diagnostics Model diagnostics Model diagnostics
R-squared: 83% R-squared: 89% R-squared: 72% R-squared: 88%
Notes: Model 7 is TDt = β0 + β1t + β2t2 + β3COt + ut , where TDt (IAit : i = 1, . . . ,N) = (1/N)Ni=1(IAIL,t − IAit )/IAIL,t . Technological distance TDt is computed by
different measures of innovation activity IAit . Each panel shows estimation results for a different measure of IAit . Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses (Newey
and West, 1987).
* Denotes parameter significance at the 10% level.
** Denotes parameter significance at the 5% level.
*** Denotes parameter significance at the 1% level.6. Summary and conclusions
We have extended Pakes (1985) by considering different
dynamic measures of innovation activity, that capture patented
R&D activity (i.e., publicly disclosed innovations) and non-
patented R&D activity (i.e., non-appropriated R&D or trade
secrets), and innovation spillovers. Patented and non-patented
R&D activities have been estimated by using a latent-factor
patent count panel data model, which estimates different patent
propensity for each firm. We use a large panel dataset of 4476companies from all manufacturing and service industries of the
US for period 1979–2000. Firms have been classified into different
technological clusters, where each cluster includes technologically
similar firms.
We have focused on a specific cluster of 111 firms that
are mostly from the drugs market sector. In this technological
cluster, the patent innovation leader (Merck) and followers have
been identified. We have studied dynamic interactions between
patent innovation leaders and patent innovation followers in
the technological cluster, and allowed firms to have different15
(a) Competition and mean patent application count. (b) Competition and mean R&D activity.
(c) Competition and mean non-patented R&D activity. (d) Competition and mean patent propensity.
Fig. 7. Competition and innovation in the pharmaceutical technological cluster. Notes: Competition is COt ; mean patent count is (1/N)
N
i=1 Pit ; mean R&D activity is
(1/N)
N
i=1 P
o
it ; mean non-patented R&D activity is (1/N)
N
i=1 P
o
it (1 − P∗it ); mean patent propensity is (1/N)
N
i=1 P
∗
it . Polynomial regression and logistic function least
squares estimates of the dependent variable are presented for period t = 1979, . . . , 2000. The R-squares correspond to the polynomial regression model.patent propensities. In the patent count panel data model,
patent propensity is driven by the latent common factor that
represents aggregate technological cluster characteristics and
measures (for example, the degree of market competition, degree
of deregulation, degree of enforcement of intellectual property
rights and degree of information that is common knowledge).
Given the estimates of patented and non-patented R&D activity,
we have studied R&D spillover effects between patent innovation
leader and followers by PVAR models.
Our PVAR estimates have supported the findings of Pakes
(1985) about dynamic effects among stock return, R&D expenses
and patent application counts of US firms. The extended PVAR
models show that non-patented R&D activity is an important dy-
namic determinant of both patented and non-patented R&D activ-
ities in the cluster of technologically similar firms. We have found
positive dynamic spillover effects from patent innovation leader
to followers, but not the other way around. The positive spillover
effects from the innovation leader to followers suggest that firms
are neck-and-neck in innovation activity in the drugs technolog-
ical cluster. We have found that in the beginning of the 1990s
both competition and innovation increase significantly. This sug-
gests that on average the escape competition effect dominates the
Schumpeterian effect in the competition and innovation relation-
ship in the drugs technological cluster. Market competition is the
driver of the common latent factor that affects patent propensity
of firms, showing that firms have patented a higher proportion of
their innovation output as a reaction to the increasing level of com-
petition in the technological cluster during the 1990s.
In summary, we find that competition is a driver of innovation,
which affects positively the number of patent applications and
the propensity to patent. The transmission channel between stock
return and innovation output of firms is through R&D investmentdecisions, as predicted by the theoretical framework of Pakes
(1985).
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Appendix A
We derive Eq. (4.4) from Eq. (4.3) as follows. Eq. (4.3) is qit
rit
ln Pit

=
0 0 0
0 ζ22 0
0 γ0ζ22 + ζ32 ζ33
 qit−1
rit−1
ln Pit−1

+
 1 0 0
c20θ 1 0
c20θγ0 γ0 1

ϵit + η1it
c20vit
η3it

. (A.1)16
.6)
ϵit + η1it
c20vit
η3it

∼ N
00
0

,
 σ 21 + σ 22 c20[θ2σ 21 + (1− θ)2σ 22 ] 0c20[θ2σ 21 + (1− θ)2σ 22 ] c220[θ2σ 21 + (1− θ)2σ 22 ] 0
0 0 σ 23
 (A
Box II.The first and second error terms are not orthogonal in this system
since ϵit = θqit + vit . First, we derive the covariance matrix of
the errors in Eq. (A.1). The covariance between the first and second
errors is
Cov(ϵit + η1it , c20vit) = Cov(θqit + vit + η1it , c20vit)
= c20Var(vit) (A.2)
where second equality uses the fact that η1it , qit , and vit are
orthogonal. We express vit as
vit = ϵit − θqit = ϵit − θ(ϵit + η1it) = (1− θ)ϵit − θη1it . (A.3)
Taking the variance of this equation, we have
Var(vit) = (1− θ)2Var(ϵit)+ θ2Var(η1it)
= θ2σ 21 + (1− θ)2σ 22 . (A.4)
Therefore,
Cov(ϵit + η1it , c20vit) = c20[θ2σ 21 + (1− θ)2σ 22 ]. (A.5)
The distribution of errors in Eq. (A.1) is presented in Box II.
We introduce the following notation: σ 21 + σ 22 c20[θ2σ 21 + (1− θ)2σ 22 ] 0c20[θ2σ 21 + (1− θ)2σ 22 ] c220[θ2σ 21 + (1− θ)2σ 22 ] 0
0 0 σ 23

≡
 σ˙ 21 σ˙12 0σ˙12 σ˙ 22 0
0 0 σ 23
 . (A.7)
The Cholesky matrix of the error covariance matrix is σ˙ 21 σ˙12 0σ˙12 σ˙ 22 0
0 0 σ 23
1/2 =

σ˙1 0 0
σ˙12
σ˙1

σ˙ 22 −
σ˙ 212
σ˙ 21
0
0 0 σ3
 . (A.8)
Using this Cholesky matrix, we write Eq. (A.1) to make the error
vector orthogonal: qit
rit
ln Pit

=
0 0 0
0 ζ22 0
0 γ0ζ22 + ζ32 ζ33
 qit−1
rit−1
ln Pit−1

+

σ˙1 0 0
c20θσ˙1 + σ˙12
σ˙1

σ˙ 22 −
σ˙ 212
σ˙ 21
0
γ0

c20θσ˙1 + σ˙12
σ˙1

γ0

σ˙ 22 −
σ˙ 212
σ˙ 21
σ3

e1it
e2it
e3it

(A.9)
where (e1it , e2it , e3it)′ ∼ N(03×1, I3). We simplify the notation in
Eq. (A.9) by defining new parameters: qit
rit
ln Pit

=
0 0 0
0 ζ22 0
0 γ0ζ22 + ζ32 ζ33
 qit−1
rit−1
ln Pit−1

+

σ˜1 0 0
σ˜12 σ˜2 0
γ0σ˜12 γ0σ˜2 σ3
e1it
e2it
e3it

(A.10)
where σ˜1, σ˜12, and σ˜2 can be expressed by the original parameters
based on Eqs. (A.7) and (A.9).Appendix B
IRF for Models 1, 2 and 4
We use the following compact matrix notation for Models 1, 2
and 4:
Yit = ai + ζYit−1 +Ωeit (B.1)
where Yit is a K×1 vector of the endogenous variables; ai is a K×1
vector of fixed effects;Ω is a lower triangular matrix with positive
elements in its diagonal; eit ∼ N(0K×1, IK ) is the vector of error
terms. We write Eq. (B.1) as
(IK − ζ L)Yit = ai +Ωeit (B.2)
Yit = (IK − ζ L)−1ai + (IK − ζ L)−1Ωeit (B.3)
Yit =
∞
j=0
ζ jai +
∞
j=0
ζ jΩeit−j. (B.4)
Then, the IRF matrices are given by
Θj = ∂Yit+j
∂eit
= ζ jΩ for j = 0, 1, 2, . . . ,∞. (B.5)
IRF for Model 5
We use the following compact matrix notation for Model 5:
Yit = ai + ζYit−1 + ζILYIL,t−1Dit(i ∈ IF)
+ ζIF

k∈IF
Yk,t−1

Dit(i = IL)+Ωeit (B.6)
where Yit is a 4×1 vector of the endogenous variables; ai is a 4×1
vector of fixed effects;Ω is a lower triangular matrix with positive
elements in its diagonal; eit ∼ N(04×1, I4) is the vector of error
terms. We write Eq. (B.6) as
Yit = (I4 − ζ L)−1ai + (I4 − ζ L)−1ζILYIL,t−1D(i ∈ IF)
+ (I4 − ζ L)−1

k∈IF
ζIFYk,t−1

D(i = IL)+ (I4 − ζ L)−1Ωeit (B.7)
Yit =
∞
j=0
ζ jai +
 ∞
j=0
ζ jζILYIL,t−1−j

D(i ∈ IF)
+
 ∞
j=0

k∈IF
ζ jζIFYk,t−1−j

D(i = IL)+
∞
j=0
ζ jΩeit−j. (B.8)
Then, we get the IRF matrices
Θj = ζ jΩ for j = 0, 1, 2, . . . ,∞ (B.9)
and the dynamic interaction multiplier matrices
Γj(IL→ IF) = (effects of YIL,t−j on Yit for i ∈ IF)
= ζ jζIL for j = 0, 1, 2, . . . ,∞ (B.10)
Γj(IF→ IL) = (effects of Yk,t−j on YIL,t for k ∈ IF)
= ζ jζIF for j = 0, 1, 2, . . . ,∞. (B.11)17
Appendix C
The Poisson-type patent count panel data model that involves
the common competitive latent factor is estimated by the SML
method (Gouriéroux andMonfort, 1991). The likelihood function is
evaluated by using the EIS technique of Richard and Zhang (2007).
The conditional density of l∗t is given by
f ∗(l∗t |l∗t−1) =
1√
2π
exp

− (l
∗
t − µ∗l∗t−1)2
2

. (C.1)
The likelihood of a realization (P, L∗) ≡ (Pit , l∗t : t = 1, . . . , T ; i =
1, . . . ,N) is
N
i=1
T
t=1
f (Pit |Ft)f ∗(l∗t |l∗t−1) =
N
i=1
T
t=1

exp(−λit)(λit)Pit
Pit !
× 1√
2π
exp

− (l
∗
t − µ∗l∗t−1)2
2

. (C.2)
The likelihood of the patent counts observed is obtained by
L(P|F oT ; θ) =

RT
N
i=1
T
t=1
exp(−λit)λPitit
Pit !
× 1√
2π
exp

− (l
∗
t − µ∗l∗t−1)2
2

dL∗ (C.3)
where θ summarizes all parameters. The same likelihood function
with a compact notation is
L(P|F oT ; θ) =

RT
N
i=1
T
t=1
g(Pit , l∗t |Ft; θ)dL∗ (C.4)
where g is the joint density of (Pit , l∗t ). We introduce the auxiliary
samplerm and include it in Eq. (C.4):
L(P|F oT ; θ, θ∗)
=

RT
N
i=1
T
t=1
g(Pit , l∗t |Ft; θ)
m(l∗t |l∗t−1; θ∗t )
×m(l∗t |l∗t−1; θ∗t )dL∗ (C.5)
where θ∗ = (θ∗1 , . . . , θ∗T ) denotes the parameters of the auxiliary
sampler. Parameters of the auxiliary sampler are different in each
period. However, the functional form of this sampler is constant
over time. The importance Monte Carlo estimate of L(P|F oT ; θ, θ∗)
for a given θ∗ is
LˆR(P|F oT ; θ, θ∗) =
1
R
R
r=1
N
i=1
T
t=1
g(Pit , l∗tr |Ft; θ)
m(l∗tr |l∗t−1r; θ∗t )
(C.6)
where {l∗tr : t = 1, . . . , T } denotes the rth trajectory of i.i.d. draws
from m. Richard and Zhang (2007) suggest defining the auxiliary
samplermwith its density kernel k:
k(l∗t , l
∗
t−1; θ∗t ) = m(l∗t |l∗t−1; θ∗t )χ(l∗t−1; θ∗t ) (C.7)
where
χ(l∗t−1; θ∗t ) =

R
k(l∗t , l
∗
t−1; θ∗t )dl∗t (C.8)
denotes the integrating constant associated to k. Richard andZhang
(2007) suggest choosing k as a kernel of the normal distribution.
Moreover, similar to Bauwens and Hautsch (2006), we include f ∗
into the auxiliary sampler, m. Then, the normal density kernel is
given by
k(l∗t , l
∗
t−1; θ∗t ) = exp

θ∗1t l
∗
t + θ∗2t(l∗t )2

× exp

− (l
∗
t − µ∗l∗t−1)2
2

(C.9)where θ∗t = (θ∗1t , θ∗2t) determines the conditional mean and
variance of the auxiliary sampler for period t . The conditionalmean
µt and variance π2t of the normal auxiliary samplerm are
µt = π2t (θ∗1t + µ∗l∗t−1) (C.10)
π2t =
1
1− 2θ∗2t
. (C.11)
A trajectory of {l∗t : t = 1, . . . , T } can be generated from the
auxiliary sampler, as follows:
l∗t = µt + πtηt (C.12)
where ηt ∼ N(0, 1) are i.i.d. common random numbers. Richard
and Zhang (2007) suggest using the same set of random numbers
for every iteration of themaximum likelihood procedure (i.e., com-
mon random numbers). In the EIS method, parameters of the aux-
iliary sampler minimize the variance of the Monte Carlo estimator
of the likelihood function:
θ∗ = argmin
θ∗
Var

LˆR(P|F oT ; θ, θ∗)

= argmin
θ∗
Var

1
R
R
r=1
N
i=1
T
t=1
g(Pit , l∗tr |Ft; θ)
m(l∗tr |l∗t−1r; θ∗t )

. (C.13)
This variance isminimized by choosing such values for θ∗t forwhich
there is a good fit between g andm for every period t (see the last
equality of Eq. (C.13)). To achieve this, Richard and Zhang (2007)
suggest solving theminimization problem of Eq. (C.13) by estimat-
ing a recursive sequence of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) problems,
each being of the following form:
ln g(Pit , l∗tr |Ft; θ)+ lnχ(l∗t ; θˆ∗t+1)
= θ∗0t + θ∗1t l∗tr + θ∗2t(l∗tr)2 + utr with r = 1, . . . , R (C.14)
for t = T , . . . , 1, χ(l∗T , θˆ∗T+1) = 1 and θˆ∗t+1 is the OLS estimate
of θ∗t+1. These regressions are run backwards, from T to 1 and the
sample size of each regression is equal to the number of trajecto-
ries drawn R. In our estimation we choose R = 50.
The right side of Eq. (C.14) includes the log kernel of the
auxiliary sampler. Normal distribution is used for the auxiliary
sampler since the log kernel of the normal distribution is a second
order polynomial therefore its parameters canbe estimatedbyOLS.
The EIS technique involves the estimation of a large number of
parameters of the auxiliary sampler in the SML procedure. The OLS
method provides auxiliary sampler parameter estimates rapidly
thus EIS based SML estimation is feasible in practice. We can
summarize the EIS method as follows:
• Step 1: Draw R = 50 trajectories {l∗tr}Tt=1 from the distribution
N(µ∗l∗t−1r , 1).
• Step 2: For each t = T , . . . , 1, estimate by OLS Eq. (C.14) to get
the parameters ofm.
• Step 3: Draw R = 50 trajectories {l∗tr}Tt=1 from the auxiliary sam-
plers.
• Repeat Steps 2 and 3 five times.
• Step 4: Estimate the value of the likelihood function according
to Eq. (C.6).18
Appendix D
In order to approximate the value of l∗t , we compute its
filtered estimates E[l∗t |F ot ], where we condition on the observable
information set
F ot = [(Pi1, ri1, BVi1, BCintra,i1, BCinter,i1), . . . ,
(Pit−1, rit−1, BVit−1, BCintra,it−1, BCinter,it−1),
(rit , BVit , BCintra,it , BCinter,it) : i = 1, . . . ,N]. (D.1)
The conditional expectation of l∗t is
E[l∗t |F ot ] =

R
l∗t h(l
∗
t |F ot )dl∗t (D.2)
where h denotes the conditional density of l∗t . We introduce Pt =
(Pis : i = 1, . . . ,N; s = 1, . . . , t) and L∗t = (l∗s : s = 1, . . . , t). We
compute h as follows:
h(l∗t |F ot ) =
g˙(Pt−1, l∗t |F ot )
f (Pt−1|F ot )
=

Rt−1 f
∗(l∗t |l∗t−1)g¨(Pt−1, L∗t−1|Ft)dL∗t−1
Rt−1 g¨(Pt−1, L
∗
t−1|Ft)dL∗t−1
(D.3)
where g˙ , f , g¨ , and f ∗ are conditional density functions of
the corresponding random variables or random vectors. By
substituting Eq. (D.3) into Eq. (D.2) and using the fact that the
denominator in Eq. (D.3) is not a function of l∗t , we obtain
E[l∗t |F ot ] =

Rt l
∗
t f
∗(l∗t |l∗t−1)g¨(Pt−1, L∗t−1|Ft)dL∗t
Rt−1 g¨(Pt−1, L
∗
t−1|Ft)dL∗t−1
(D.4)
where the joint density ö is given by
g¨(Pt−1, L∗t−1|Ft) =
N
i=1
t−1
s=1
exp(−λis)λPisis
Pis!
× 1√
2π
exp

− (l
∗
s − µ∗l∗s−1)2
2

. (D.5)
The high-dimensional integrals in Eq. (D.4) are estimated by the
EIS technique.
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